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I. Introduction
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is experiencing one of
the world’s worst economic crises in recent history and by far the
worst in its history.1 Promulgated by failed policies of its two most
recent presidents, current President Nicolás Maduro and the late
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s future economic stability looks bleak.
Currently, Venezuela’s debt exceeds its Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) by over 100%, hyperinflation is over 400%, unemployment
is around 20%, and Venezuela is struggling to be current on its bond
payments.2 This economic crisis has led to a shortage of basic

† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law. Notes & Comments
Editor, North Carolina Journal of International Law. The author would like to thank all
of the teachers and fellow law students who provided insight, tips, and suggestions on the
paper. Their guidance and assistance was invaluable.
1 Venezuela’s Worst Economic Crisis: What Went Wrong?, AL JAZEERA (May 3,
2018), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/venezuela-worst-economiccrisis-wrong-170501063130120.html [https://perma.cc/2QXF-BK9R].
2 Id.
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necessities for its people, such as food and medicine, because the
country has prioritized paying its debts in lieu of these supplies.3
Thus, the debt of Venezuela and its wholly owned oil company,
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), require a restructuring in
order to prevent widespread default. This Note focuses on
restructuring PDVSA’s debt, which will, given the dire economic
situation, be no easy task.4
PDVSA generates about 95% of Venezuela’s revenue,5 which
further complicates the restructuring scenario because it is so vital
to the economy—as PDVSA goes, so does Venezuela. Notably,
PDVSA possesses assets located outside of Venezuela, such as
shares of its subsidiary, PDV Holding, and its most valuable asset
CITGO Petroleum—both of which are Delaware corporations that
could be subject to seizure from creditors.6 Along with the
uncertainty of how to protect its assets in PDV Holding and
CITGO,7 PDVSA’s creditors vary dramatically. PDVSA owes
billions of dollars of claims to secured and unsecured creditors,
bond holders, promissory note holders, and, possibly, judicial

3 Patrick Gillespie et al., Venezuela: How a Rich Country Collapsed, CNN MONEY
(July 30, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/26/news/economy/venezuela-economiccrisis/index.html [https://perma.cc/K98Q-9VL2] [hereinafter Gillespie et al.].
4 This Note builds upon the ideas and analysis from another paper I coauthored,
PDVSA’s Hail Mary: A Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Solution, (with Rich Gittings, Samantha
Hovaniec,
Matt
Taylor,
and
Heather
Werner),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161604.
5 Dion Rabouin, Venezuela Default More Likely on Sovereign Bonds Than
PDVSA’s: Bondholders, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usvenezuela-debt/venezuela-default-more-likely-on-sovereign-bonds-than-pdvsasbondholders-idUSKBN1E92UX [https://perma.cc/RT2V-2YY8].
6 Tom Hals, Venezuelan Creditors Eyeing Citgo Assets Face Uphill Battle, REUTERS
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-citgo-bondholdersanalysis/venezuelan-creditors-eyeing-citgo-assets-face-uphill-battle-idUSKBN1E838E
[https://perma.cc/9XHB-8MK3].
7 Venezuela can seek a discharge or protection for its assets in PDV Holdings and
CITGO by having both entities file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States or move
the account receivables or shares to a bank in Venezuela to escape seizure from creditors.
See Mark Walker & Richard Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework
11–12,
MILLSTEIN
&
CO.
(Sept.
19,
2017)
available
at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039678 [https://perma.cc/7DSG-HUBQ] [hereinafter
Walker & Cooper],. However, it would be more beneficial if PDV Holding and CITGO
attempted to receive protection from PDVSA’s Chapter 15 proceeding. This would mean
their assets would be protected and their debts discharged or significantly reduced.
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claimants.8 The reluctance of creditors to provide funding and
credit to PDVSA due to the dire situation, along with PDVSA’s
dependence on oil and third parties, makes for an uphill battle for
PDVSA to repay its debt.9
Adding to the complexity, various nations, including the United
States, have imposed sanctions against the Venezuelan government
for its corruption and failure to create sustainable economic
conditions.10 These sanctions prohibit PDVSA from issuing any
new debt,11 presenting an almost impossible barrier to overcome for
any restructuring.12 The restructuring plan detailed below assumes
that these sanctions will be lifted and leaves PDVSA with one
question going forward: what is the best way to restructure its debt?
This Note posits a solution in the form of a Chapter 15 foreign
bankruptcy proceeding of the United States Bankruptcy Code13 to
answer PDVSA’s debt restructuring question.14 If successful, this
plan protects PDVSA’s assets and seriously reduces or completely
eliminates the debt of PDVSA and its Venezuelan entities from
Id. at 3.
Id. at 13–14.
10 See, e.g., Resolution on EU Political Relations with Latin America, EUR. PARL.
DOC. P8_TA (2017)0345 (2017), [hereinafter EU Resolution of September 13] available
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8TA-2017-0345+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [https://perma.cc/76ND-BS6F] (EU sanctions);
see also Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar. 8, 2015).
11 See, e.g., EU Resolution of September 13, supra note 10.
12 One way, if not the only, to restructure under the sanctions requires an entity to
petition to the Office of Foreign Assets Control to obtain a license to engage in the
prohibited activity.
OFAC License Application Page, TREASURY.GOV,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/licensing.aspx
[https://perma.cc/U8Z2-TWG9] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
13 Ch. 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code enables a U.S. bankruptcy court to recognize
a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, as long as all of the requirements are met, and then
provides assistance with the proceeding. Part of Ch. 15’s goals are to protect financially
troubled business that involve cross-border insolvencies. The U.S. court assists with the
foreign proceeding in order to provide protections of trade, investment, employment, as
well as protect the interests of creditors and debtors. See 11 U.S.C.§ 1501(a) (2018)
(stating the purpose of § 1501). This Note focuses on restructuring PDVSA bonds, and
not Venezuela’s bonds, because of the vital importance of PDVSA to Venezuela. A
restructuring of these bonds will in turn benefit Venezuela.
14 The idea of putting PDVSA through a Chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding came
from the work of Mark A. Walker & Richard J. Cooper, in their publication Venezuela’s
Restructuring: A Realistic Framework, supra note 7. This Note aims to build upon their
ideas and to resolve problems that they did not address.
8
9
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promissory note holders, bond debt, and any judicial claims.
Additionally, this proceeding may also protect the assets and
discharge the debt for PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as
PDV Holding and CITGO.15 Importantly, even if this plan is
unsuccessful, pursuing a Chapter 15 bankruptcy provides PDVSA
benefits and leverage while the bankruptcy court makes its decision.
Thus, this plan provides a win-win option for PDVSA.
PDVSA’s debts definitely require a restructuring, but given
PDVSA’s importance to the Venezuelan economy, a restructuring
where Venezuela relinquishes its control of PDVSA is not an option
because it presents a paramount risk that could prove detrimental to
the Venezuelan economy. Yet, maintaining ownership in a Chapter
15 bankruptcy restructuring could violate the absolute priority rule
of U.S. bankruptcy law that prevents debtors from maintaining
ownership unless all unsecured creditors are paid in full.16
Fortunately, Venezuela maintains control without violating the
absolute priority rule under this Chapter 15 solution by utilizing a
Chapter 11 § 363 sale that discharges any adverse interests on
PDVSA’s assets,17 similar to the sale utilized in the General Motors
bankruptcy in the United States.18 A new government owned entity,
New PDVSA, would then emerge from the sale with PDVSA’s
assets without any encumbrances. Before consummating the sale,
PDVSA must file under a public-sector insolvency law—which will
first need to be passed by Venezuela—and PDVSA must petition
for a Chapter 15 proceeding, meet the eligibility requirements of §
109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and satisfy the recognition
requirements of § 1515 and § 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code in order
to receive relief under Chapter 15.19 If PDVSA fails to meet any of
15 It is possible that PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as PDV Holding and
CITGO, may receive protection and a discharge from PDVSA’s Chapter 15 proceeding if
they argue PDVSA’s proceeding significantly relates to their business. See, e.g., Order
Recognizing Foreign Proceeding and Granting Additional Relief at 3, In re Hibu, Inc., No
8-14-70323 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2014) (recognizing “foreign nonmain proceedings”
as distinct from the court’s adjudication).
16 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B), 1115(a) (2018) (describing provisions for
unsecured creditor claims, and defining an individual’s estate’s property).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018).
18 See In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining the sale used in
General Motors’ bankruptcy proceeding).
19 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing debtor eligibility requirements);
see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (listing foreign representative recognition
requirements and describing recognition procedure).
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these requirements, relief will not be granted.20 These requirements
may prove insurmountable for PDVSA, but PDVSA can present
strong arguments for each requirement. Yet, even if PDVSA fails
to meet these requirements, this solution gives leverage to PDVSA
and Venezuela in its out of court restructuring negotiations against
potential holdout creditors. Thus, PDVSA should consider filing
for bankruptcy under Chapter 15 because it provides PDVSA
protection and leverage that no other restructuring plan can offer—
protection of its assets and an increased likelihood of negotiating a
beneficial out of court restructuring while simultaneously
presenting its own restructuring possibility that leaves it free and
clear of adverse interests.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly describes the
current economic crisis in Venezuela and details the policy actions
of President Maduro and the late President Chávez that laid the
groundwork for the crisis. Part III analyzes the Chapter 15
framework. Additionally, this section details the benefits and
leverage PDVSA acquires with each requirement it meets. Part IV
concludes by summarizing the arguments and listing potential
concerns.
II. Background of the Crisis
Venezuela leads the world in crude oil reserves.21 With this
asset and its state-owned oil company, PDVSA, Venezuela
experienced tremendous growth and became the richest economy in
South America.22
However, being dependent on a single
commodity makes an economy more susceptible to economic
volatility.23 It also presents a vital asset that potential creditors in a
restructuring would attempt to seize.24 Notwithstanding the

See 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(3) (2018).
Gillespie et al., supra note 3.
22 Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Venezuela Went From the Richest Economy in
South America to the Brink of Financial Ruin, INDEPENDENT (May 21, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richesteconomy-in-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html
[https://perma.cc/VY73-8LDA] [hereinafter Fisher & Taub].
23 See Gillespie et al., supra note 3 (illustrating the volatility caused by Venezuela’s
reliance on petroleum).
24 Mark Weidemaier & Matt Gauthier, Venezuela as a Case Study in Limited
(Sovereign)
Liability,
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882835 [https://perma.cc/D9C520
21
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potential for growth, Venezuela spiraled into its worst economic
crisis.25
From an economics standpoint, the numbers are eye-opening.
As Mark Walker from the financial firm Millstein & Co., and
Richard Cooper from the law firm Cleary Gottlieb point out in their
restructuring proposal, Venezuela’s economic situation is one of
drastic proportions.26 They list the following as some of the key
issues: hyperinflation, debts exceeding $196 billion, reduction in
reserves, and a collapse of its banking system, reduction in GDP by
more than 30% in the last few years, a national income reduction of
51% in the last several years, and debts exceeding GDP by 150%.27
As will be explained below, the failed policies of its two most recent
presidents, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, laid the groundwork
for this crisis.
Given these financial difficulties and the
unlikelihood of PDVSA repaying these debts, PDVSA must
restructure its debts to avoid widespread default.
Hugo Chávez was elected President in 1998,28 and he remained
in this position for fourteen years29 by winning four consecutive
elections.30 His populist ideals centered on overtaking the corrupt
elite and establishing unity between the different social classes.31
Upon his first election, he quickly galvanized support for his social
policies that simultaneously saw a reduction in the check on his
authority.32 Initially, the people viewed this as beneficial; however,
corruption, protests, and struggles against those that opposed him

RKTA].
25 See, e.g., Gillespie et al., supra note 3 (illustrating the extent of Venezuela’s
economic crisis); see also Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (describing Venezuela’s economic
crisis).
26 See Walker and Cooper, supra note 7, at 1.
27 Id. at 24.
28 Edgardo Lander, Venezuelan Social Conflict in Global Context, in VENEZUELA:
HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE DECLINE OF AN “EXCEPTIONAL DEMOCRACY” 16, 17 (Steve Ellner
& Miguel T. Salas eds., 2007) [hereinafter Lander].
29 ELENA BLOCK, COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP: MIMETISATION, HUGO CHÁVEZ
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POWER AND IDENTITY 228 (Kenneth Rogerson & Laura Roselle
eds., 2016) [https://perma.cc/UD4Y-96UU] [hereinafter BLOCK].
30 Id. at 229.
31 See Lander, supra note 28, at 26.
32 See, e.g., Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (“[Chávez] passed a new constitution and
purged government jobs . . . [and he] abolish[ed] the legislature’s upper house[.]”).
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resulted, and this created social division.33 Moreover, as Chávez
grew in power, so too did his control over PDVSA,34 a key
contributor to Venezuela’s revenue. Chávez seized the opportunity
to utilize PDVSA’s funds for social welfare programs, such as
lowering food prices,35
instead of improving the revenue
capabilities of Venezuela and PDVSA. This decimated PDVSA and
its ability to make money, despite an increase in oil prices.36 The
price increase prompted Chávez to borrow tremendous amounts of
money from various creditors,37 which put Venezuela and PDVSA
in an even weaker position to make money when oil prices dropped
in 2014.38 Chávez died in 2013, leaving his successor, Nicolás
Maduro, to clean up the mess.39 Unfortunately, President Maduro
has exacerbated the situation.
Facing opposition ever since his election, President Maduro has
jailed thousands and asserted control over every aspect of the
government in order to maintain power.40 Because of the continued
improper management of PDVSA, Maduro’s focus on staying in
control, and the country’s inability to pay its debts from excess
borrowing, more money needed to be printed to make payments,
causing tremendous inflation in the process.41 In an effort to avoid

33 See, e.g., id. (“When courts challenged Chávez, he gutted them, suspending
unfriendly judges and packing the supreme court with loyalists.”); see also BLOCK, supra
note 29, at 229–30 (Chávez was “an elected autocrat that ‘bullied’ those who ‘challenged
or angered him’; a man leading a ‘socialist revolution’, whose ideologies were ‘never as
extremist as he or his detractors made out’ . . . . Chávez did not achieve an effective reform
of the state, but rather ran a centralized and militaristic regime that concentrated ‘all power
in the president’s hand.’”).
34 See, e.g., Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (“[Chávez] fired 18,000 PDVSA
workers . . . and replaced them with some 100,000 supporters.”).
35 Id.
36 Rick Gladstone, How Venezuela Fell Into Crisis, and What Could Happen Next,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(May
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-what-next.html
[https://perma.cc/8ECJ-TM66].
37 Id.
38 Fisher & Taub, supra note 22.
39 Id.
40 Venezuela’s Leader Nicolás Maduro Divides Opinion, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20664349
[https://perma.cc/JEN5GHQ3].
41 See Gladstone, supra note 36.
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default and due to the inability to fund the social welfare programs,42
Maduro froze prices, causing a shortage of food, medicine, and
inputs.43 As the government prioritized paying its debts over these
necessities,44 the shortage further increased prices of goods and shut
down some businesses.45
The compounding mismanagement from both presidents,
coupled with the lack of necessities available for its people, has not
gone unnoticed by other countries. For example, the United States
sanctioned several Venezuelan government officials because of the
corruption, lack of economic sustainability, and political oppression
under the current regime.46 The sanctions are a way to force Maduro
and other government officials out of office and to protect American
bondholders by preventing its citizens from buying Venezuelan and
PDVSA bonds.47 Specifically, the sanctions prohibit any U.S.
person from engaging in transactions related to any new debt of
PDVSA and Venezuela.48 This prevents Venezuela and PDVSA
from acquiring funds from more creditors. Additionally, the United
States blocked property and interests into Venezuela to prevent cash
flows from entering into the corrupt government.49 Thus, the
government in Venezuela is being squeezed out to make sure they
“promote and defend democratic governance.”50
Arguably,
Venezuela and PDVSA can only pay its debt and restructure if a
new government is put in place. Even if the current regime
continues and the United States lifts the sanctions, a Chapter 15
bankruptcy proceeding provides a possible restructuring solution.

Id.
Id.
44 Fisher & Taub, supra note 22.
45 Katia Porzecanski, Why Venezuela Doesn’t Get it Over With and Default,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-09/whyvenezuela-struggles-so-hard-to-avoid-default-quicktake-q-a
[https://perma.cc/R2JZYW5B].
46 Patricia Mazzei, U.S. Sanctions Four More Venezuela Officials, N. Y. TIMES (Jan.
5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/world/americas/venezuela-us-sanctionsmaduro.html [https://perma.cc/5VF9-UBE4].
47 See id.
48 Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017).
49 See Exec. Order No. 13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar. 11, 2015).
50 Venezuela-Related
Sanctions,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/83JQ-EBAV] (last visited
Feb. 10, 2018).
42
43
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III. Restructuring PDVSA with a Chapter 15 Proceeding
As noted earlier, a default is approaching for Venezuela—the
country simply does not have enough money to pay its debts.51 The
last reported number Venezuela had in its reserves accounted for
less than $10 billion, and that was in July 2017.52 Barring a massive
investment from Russia or China, the default will happen sooner
rather than later.53 With this in mind, PDVSA’s debts require a
restructuring to prevent a widespread default in Venezuela.
Significantly, because of PDVSA’s vital importance, a Chapter 15
bankruptcy restructuring should only be done where Venezuela
maintains control of PDVSA without violating the absolute priority
rule of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.54 The absolute priority rule, one
of the key features of the American bankruptcy system, states that
equity holders in a bankrupt business cannot receive or retain
anything under the confirmed plan on account of their equity in the
debtor unless all of the unsecured creditors are paid in full.55
Venezuela does not violate the absolute priority rule by utilizing a
Chapter 11 § 363 sale, similar to the General Motors bankruptcy
proceeding in the United States.56 Under a confirmation plan that
utilizes a § 363 auction sale, the Venezuelan government would
create a new corporate entity, New PDVSA, for the purpose of
buying PDVSA’s assets, then use the bankruptcy procedure to
“auction” PDVSA, with the new corporate entity acting as a stalking
horse bidder.57 Because § 363 explicitly allows the assets of a
Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 2–4.
Patrick Gillespie, Venezuela has Less Than $10 Billion—Lowest Reserves in Over
20
Years,
CNN
MONEY
(July
17,
2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/17/news/economy/venezuela-reserves-20-yearlow/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2AB-8697].
53 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 10.
54 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B), 1115(a) (2018) (describing provisions for
unsecured creditor claims and defining an individual estate’s property); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(f) (2018) (avoiding violation of the absolute priority rule by utilizing a Chapter 11
§ 363 sale that discharges any adverse interests on PDVSA’s assets).
55 Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
444–45 (1999). If the Venezuelan bankruptcy plan violated such a key tenet of American
bankruptcy law, it is unlikely that the plan would be confirmed by the U.S. bankruptcy
courts.
56 See In re GMC, 407 B.R. at 463–520.
57 A stalking horse bid is an initial bid on the bankrupt company’s assets used by the
debtor to prevent against low bidding. David Schilli, Asset Sales Under the Bankruptcy
Code,
ROBINSON
BRADSHAW
PUB.
(Apr.
2009),
51
52
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debtor to be sold free and clear of any debts that may have
encumbered the assets, the Venezuelan government maintains
continued control of PDVSA free and clear of any adverse
interests.58 Under this proposed plan, the government of Venezuela
receives nothing on account of their interest in PDVSA, but would
instead receive any assets it receives (to the degree to which it
receives any assets while acting through New PDVSA) instead on
account of the new value it has contributed to the estate through the
§ 363 sale.59 Thus, this would not violate the absolute priority rule.
In order for this to occur, Venezuela must pass a public-sector
insolvency law, and PDVSA must file under that law. 60 Notably,
the Venezuelan law does not need to be identical to the United
States’ bankruptcy law, but it should provide some similarities and
adequate protections. Case law and other countries that have
experienced similar situations to Venezuela provide some guidance
for Venezuela to improve its own chances of gaining recognition.
After the law passes and PDVSA files for bankruptcy, PDVSA must
satisfy the person and property eligibility requirements of §
109(a).61 By arguing that PDVSA is not an instrumentality of
Venezuela, or, in the alternative, by arguing that Chapter 15’s
broader scope warrants eligibility as a person, and by opening a
bank account in New York to establish property in the United States,
PDVSA meets the eligibility requirements.62 PDVSA satisfies the

https://www.robinsonbradshaw.com/newsroom-publications-Asset-Sales-under-theBankruptcy-Code-04-23-2009.html [https://perma.cc/F36Q-59LG]. Chapter 15 permits
foreign bankruptcy proceedings to seek assistance from the United States in their
proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)-(b) (2018); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2018) (“a
‘foreign main proceeding’ means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the
debtor has the center of its main interests.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2) (2018) (permitting
use of § 363 upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding).
58 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018).
59 See id. § 363.
60 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing who qualifies as a debtor); see
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (explaining the application and order for recognition
of a foreign proceeding).
61 Only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the
United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(2018).
62 See id.
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recognition requirements of § 151563 and § 151764 by petitioning
to a U.S. Bankruptcy Court as a foreign main proceeding. However,
a U.S. Bankruptcy Court must not invoke § 150665 by finding the
63 (a) A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition of a foreign
proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed by filing a
petition for recognition.
(b) A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by—
(1) a certified copy of the decision commencing such foreign proceeding and
appointing the foreign representative;
(2) a certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign
proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign representative; or
(3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), any other
evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of such foreign proceeding and
of the appointment of the foreign representative.
(c) A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied by a statement identifying
all foreign proceedings with respect to the debtor that are known to the foreign
representative.
(d) The documents referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) shall be
translated into English. The court may require a translation into English of
additional documents.
11 U.S.C. § 1515 (2018).
64 (a) [s]ubject to section 1506, after notice and a hearing, an order recognizing
a foreign proceeding if—
(1) such proceeding for which recognition is sought is a foreign main proceeding
or foreign nonmain proceeding within the meaning of section 1502;
(2) the foreign representative applying for recognition is a person or body; and
(3) the petition meets the requirements of section 1515.
(b) Such proceeding shall be recognized—
(1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is pending in the country where the debtor
has the center of its main interests; or
(2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has an establishment within the
meaning of section 1502 in the foreign country where the proceeding is pending.
(c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be decided upon at the
earliest possible time. Entry of an order recognizing a foreign proceeding
constitutes recognition under this chapter.
(d) The provisions of this subchapter do not prevent modification or termination
of recognition if it is shown that the grounds for granting it were fully or partially
lacking or have ceased to exist, but in considering such action the court shall give
due weight to possible prejudice to parties that have relied upon the order granting
recognition. A case under this chapter may be closed in the manner prescribed
under section 350.
11 U.S.C. § 1517 (2018).
65 Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed
by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2018).

12

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

proceeding to be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States or for it to be fraudulent. Finally, the § 363 66 plan
must be confirmed. Overall, meeting all of the requirements
presents a tall but surmountable task for PDVSA. Regardless, even
if PDVSA fails to commence their proceeding, whether because it
is ineligible or it is unrecognized, it still gains valuable benefits and
leverage over potential holdout creditors by going through the
bankruptcy process.
A. Making a Public-Sector Bankruptcy Law
The first step requires Venezuela to enact a public-sector
bankruptcy law. As noted above, Venezuela lacks a public-sector
bankruptcy law.67 Enacting one is a fundamental necessity because
a foreign proceeding must be ongoing to gain relief under Chapter
15.68 Venezuela must create this law with the mindset of gaining
recognition by a U.S. court. Because comity and cooperation guide
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,69 and to improve its own chances of
recognition, the law should promote fairness and provide adequate
protections for debtors and creditors. Thus, some key aspects that
this law could contain are the benefit of an automatic stay for
debtors to obtain relief from any attempts at creditor collection, 70
procedural and substantive due process for creditors enforcing their
claims, an ability to discharge debt, protection of creditors,
prevention of fraudulent transfers, and the ability for the debtor to

66 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018) (“The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) . . .
free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4)
such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”).
67 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing who qualifies as a debtor); see
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (explaining the application and order for recognition
of a foreign proceeding).
68 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b)(1) (2018).
69 Peter M. Gilhuly et al., Bankruptcy Without Borders: A Comprehensive Guide to
the First Decade of Chapter 15, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 54 (2016) [hereinafter
Gilhuly et al.]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b) (2018) (“[T]he court shall consider whether
such additional assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure
[protections.]”).
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018).
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continue and reorganize its operations.71
Notably, Venezuela’s bankruptcy law does not need to be
identical to the law of the United States.72 Despite stark differences
in the law, several proceedings have gained recognition by the U.S.
bankruptcy courts. For example, in In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd.,73
a Third Circuit Bankruptcy Court overseeing an Australian
proceeding permitted “secured creditors to realize the full value of
their debts, and tender the excess to the company” despite U.S. law
requiring secured creditors to seek distribution from the bankruptcy
estate.74 Similarly, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of
New York recognized foreign law in an Indian bankruptcy
proceeding despite it lacking a “formal statutory mechanism for
creditor participation.”75
Although enacting a public-sector insolvency law presents some
difficulty, reviewing more recent and similar situations in Greece
and Puerto Rico can provide further guidance for Venezuela. In
2014, Puerto Rico enacted a bankruptcy law to pursue a debt
restructuring regime that enabled the government to provide
services to its citizens.76 The law comprised several different
chapters similar to U.S. law, but also contained other provisions for
corporations to restructure.77 Even though the law failed to gain
recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court because of preemption by

71 See 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b)(1)–(5) (2018) (stating that courts will consider the “(1)
just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the debtor’s property; (2)
protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of preferential or
fraudulent dispositions of property of the debtor; (4) distribution of proceeds of the
debtor’s property substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title; and
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that
such foreign proceeding concerns.”).
72 See, e.g., In re Rede Energia S.A., 515 B.R. 69, 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This
Court will not decline to extend comity and grant additional relief simply because Brazilian
bankruptcy law is not identical to U.S. bankruptcy law.”).
73 In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 728 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2013).
74 Id. at 310–11.
75 In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. 129, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
76 See Puerto Rico Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R.
Laws
371.
English
translation
available
at
http://www.lexjuris.com/lexlex/Leyes2014/lexl2014071d.htm [https://perma.cc/8XBHL9TD]; see also Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 17 (stating that the law contained a
“two-tiered consensual and in-court restructuring approach.”).
77 See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 15.
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the bankruptcy code, this law provides some guidance for
Venezuela, and importantly, preemption does not apply in
Venezuela’s situation.78 Greece, on the other hand, successfully
restructured its debt in 2012 with changes to its legal regime.79 The
change in law permitted a higher cash payout, changes to legal terms
that increased the likelihood of the survival of the bonds, and a
compulsory offer of the exchange that required approval by
creditors for two-thirds of the remaining principal.80
Additionally, because this law would represent Venezuela’s
first public-sector insolvency law, there are presently no existing
legal barriers that would prohibit the insolvency law from including
provisions sufficient to receive recognition from a U.S. bankruptcy
court. This enables Venezuela to model its law after previously
recognized laws in other countries. Courts have recognized other
foreign bankruptcy laws that include difference of payouts and
participation mechanisms,81 and therefore Venezuela’s law should
receive the same treatment if it bears some similarity to them.
Moreover, Venezuela can mirror the United States’ law as much as
possible, but as noted earlier, differences are permissible. However,
foreign bankruptcy laws that violate U.S. law, restrict a court’s
ability to administer the proceeding, or violate debtor protections
have been found to be impermissible by United States courts. 82
Therefore, Venezuela must steer away from permitting these
actions. Overall, enacting a public-sector insolvency law presents a
low barrier for Venezuela to overcome, because Venezuela’s law
should be recognized by a U.S. court if Venezuela follows the
examples of other countries or mirrors U.S. bankruptcy law.
B. Eligibility Requirements for PDVSA
The second step for Venezuela is making sure PDVSA meets
the eligibility requirements for a Chapter 15 proceeding under §
See id.
See Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, ECON.
POL’Y 513 (2013).
80 Id. at 515.
81 See In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. 129, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
82 See In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 188–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (proceeding violated U.S.
privacy law); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 363–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(considering violations of debtor protections of the automatic stay); Gilhuly et al., supra
note 69, at 70–71 (considering whether a foreign proceeding frustrates the Courts’ ability
to administer the proceeding).
78
79
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109(a). Section 103(a) explicitly states that the requirements of §
109(a) applies to Chapter 15,83 which are that only “a person that
resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the
United States . . . may be a debtor under this title.”84 The
Bankruptcy Code defines debtor in Chapter 1 as a “person or
municipality” who has filed for relief,85 and the Code’s definition
of person specifically includes corporations but excludes
“governmental units”86 such as Venezuela. Governmental unit
includes an instrumentality of a foreign state or government.87
Arguably, PDVSA falls into this category, but importantly,
instrumentality is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Courts have
found state-owned entities to be instrumentalities only where “the
relationship [between the government and entity is] an active one,
[and the entity] is actually carrying out some government
function.”88 In order to prevent classification as Venezuela’s
instrumentality, PDVSA must argue that it is not carrying out a
government function because its actions are business motivated, not
government motivated.89 Fortunately, courts have not squarely
addressed this issue;90 therefore, a court could rule PDVSA is not
Venezuela’s instrumentality. PDVSA would then be eligible by
classifying as a corporation within the “person” requirement of §
109(a).91
However, if PDVSA cannot successfully argue that they are not
Venezuela’s instrumentality, PDVSA should argue that Chapter
15’s broader scope warrants eligibility. Section 1502 defines debtor
as “an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding” with no
explicit prohibition on governmental units.92 “Entity”, as defined in
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018) (stating that Chapter 1 applies in a Chapter 15
proceeding).
84 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
85 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2018).
86 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2018).
87 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2018).
88 See In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. (In Special Liquidation), No. 13-12159,
2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1990, at *37–38; In re Nortel Networks, Inc. 669 F.3d 128, 138 (3rd
Cir. 2011); In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp. 579 B.R. 493, 15–16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2017).
89 See In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp., 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1990, at *38.
90 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 18–19.
91 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
92 11 U.S.C. §1502(1) (2018).
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§ 101, includes a “governmental unit” and therefore its
instrumentality.93 Section 1501(c) explicitly prohibits some entities
from filing under Chapter 15, but does not explicitly prohibit
governmental entities and their instrumentalities.94 Notably, some
courts have recognized the broader scope of Chapter 15 despite
explicit prohibitions.95 For example, the Eastern District of
California Bankruptcy Court in In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd.
found that, even though the foreign insurance company debtor was
explicitly prohibited to file under the Bankruptcy Code by 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(3), this did not prohibit Chapter 15 relief.96
Coupled with the broader debtor definition of Chapter 15, some
of the stated objectives of Chapter 15 are to “provide effective
mechanisms” to increase cooperation between the United States and
the foreign country, provide “greater legal certainty for trade and
investment,” and to rescue financially troubled businesses to
“protect investment and preserve employment.”97 Courts are
instructed to consider the “international origin, and the need to
promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”98
Thus, a court could be persuaded that, since PDVSA is a financially
troubled and economically significant business in need of rescue,
the objectives of Chapter 15 warrant finding PDVSA eligible.
While it is uncertain whether PDVSA would be classified as a
“person” or be eligible as an “entity,” PDVSA would still need to
prove it has “property in the United States” to satisfy § 109(a).99 As
noted in the Introduction, the only property PDVSA currently owns
in the United States are shares of its subsidiary, PDV Holding.100 As
will be discussed below, this is likely not sufficient for obtaining
eligibility, but courts have upheld another option that PDVSA can
easily meet.
PDVSA should follow the actions of the entities of In re Suntech

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2018).
In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
See Hals, supra note 6.
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Power Holdings Co.101 and In re International Bank of Azerbaijan102
and open a bank account in New York to establish “property in the
United States.”103 In Suntech, the court found that a debtor in a
foreign proceeding establishing a bank account, held by an agent for
the debtor, in New York prior to the commencement of a Chapter
15 was sufficient to render the debtor eligible for a Chapter 15
case.104 It also noted that even though the debtor had no presence in
the United States, the debtor “owes a substantial amount of United
States debt and requires recognition as a condition to the
enforcement of the scheme of arrangement in the United States.”105
Without recognition, the debtor “will be hindered from ever
establishing a United States presence or conducting future business
in the United States for fear that creditors will seize its United States
assets.”106 The Court reasoned that “[s]hutting the door on the
Debtor, where it has no other access, w[ould] hinder the
restructuring of this multi-national business as contemplated by
chapter 15.”107 Despite Suntech’s subsidiary being located in
California, the court found New York to be the proper venue
because “the assets of a subsidiary are not the assets of the
parent.”108 Thus, the bank account “represented the Debtor’s
principal United States asset at the time [of filing] the Chapter 15
petition.”109
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court in International Bank of
Azerbaijan granted recognition even though the bank accounts in
the United States represented the only U.S. property of the bank.110
The International Bank of Azerbaijan claimed that due to their U.S.
dollar denominated transactions, their economy would be adversely

In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., 520 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 20, n. 36.
103 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
104 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 399, 411–13; see also In re Octaviar Admin. Pty
Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014) (noting that a non-interest-bearing trust
account in New York constitutes property in the United States and transfers of property
“do not, in and of themselves, constitute grounds for a finding of bad faith.”).
105 In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 413.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 414.
109 Id.
110 See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 20, n. 36.
101
102
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affected if creditors could seize these assets.111
Here, New York law already governs PDVSA’s bonds,112
therefore, PDVSA should open the bank account in New York.
Notably, the amount of money in the account is irrelevant—PDVSA
only needs to open an account with the bare minimum deposit
requirement to meet the statutory requirement.113 Similar to
Suntech, PDVSA maintains no presence in the United States, but
owes substantial debt in the United States, and the prevention of the
§ 363 sale would prohibit the restructuring of this multi-national
business as contemplated by Chapter 15.114 Likewise, the location
of PDVSA’s subsidiaries in Delaware are irrelevant, and thus New
York is the proper venue.115 Moreover, similar to the International
Bank of Azerbaijan, the U.S. dollar dominates the PDVSA bonds;
therefore, creditors’ ability to seize these assets would adversely
affect the Venezuelan economy, particularly because of PDVSA’s
vital importance.116 Importantly, courts hold that § 109(a) provides
no standard or inquiry into the circumstances of acquiring the
property—debtors need only have property to meet the plain
meaning of the statute.117 Thus, PDVSA should be treated the same
and be granted eligibility under Chapter 15.118

See id.
See, e.g., PDVSA 12.75% SENIOR NOTES DUE 2022, 6 (2011), available at
https://www.bourse.lu/security/USP7807HAM71/172640
[https://perma.cc/U48WP5GS] [hereinafter PDVSA].
113 See In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000)
(“[W]e conclude that the bank accounts constitute property in the United States for
purposes of eligibility under section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of how much
money was actually in them on the petition date.”).
114 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 399, 413.
115 See id. at 414.
116 See, e.g., PDVSA, supra note 112.
117 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 413; see also In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. at 373 (“The
imposition of a requirement that property in the United States be ‘substantial,’ for example,
would subvert the intent of Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.”).
118 Because the Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding would be comprised by PDVSA
and its Venezuelan subsidiaries, all of these entities would be debtors in the Chapter 15
proceeding.
See
Organization
Chart,
PDVSA,
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6544&Itemid
=889&lang=en [https://perma.cc/PCW2-Z8WU].
111
112
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C. Obtaining Recognition of the Venezuelan Bankruptcy
Proceeding
The third step for PDVSA is to obtain recognition. Recognition
is defined as “the entry of an order granting recognition of a foreign
main proceeding or a foreign nonmain proceeding.”119 In order for
this to occur, the foreign representative120 must file a petition for
recognition,121 which commences the case.122 This petition must
meet the requirements of §§ 1515 and 1517, and the foreign
representative bears the burden of proving the proceeding as a
foreign main or nonmain proceeding.123 A foreign main proceeding
is a “foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor
has the center of its main interests,”124 while a foreign nonmain
proceeding is “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main
proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an
establishment.”125 Since PDVSA operates and has its main interests
in Venezuela, it meets the definition of a foreign main proceeding.
In order to prove the existence of a foreign main proceeding, the
foreign representative must prove all of the following seven criteria:
(1) The existence of a proceeding; (2) that is either judicial or
administrative; (3) that is collective in nature; (4) that is in a foreign
country; (5) that is authorized or conducted under a law related to
insolvency or the adjustment of debts; (6) in which the debtor’s
assets and affairs are subject to the control or supervision of a
foreign court; and (7) which proceeding is for the purpose of
11 U.S.C. § 1502(7) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (2018). A foreign representative is defined as “a person or
body, including a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign
proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or
affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.” Id.
121 11 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018) (“A petition for
recognition shall be accompanied by—(1) a certificated copy of the decision commencing
such foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative; (2) a certificate from
the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign proceeding and of the appointment
of the foreign representative; or (3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs
(1) and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of such foreign
proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign representative.”).
122 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2018).
123 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018).
124 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2018).
125 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(5) (2018) (defining establishment
as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic
activity.”).
119
120

20

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

reorganization or liquidation.126
The first step is whether a proceeding exists. A proceeding for
PDVSA’s purposes would mean a “statutory framework that
constrains a company’s actions and that regulates the final
distribution of a company’s assets.”127 This is satisfied with
Venezuela’s public-sector insolvency law. The second step requires
the proceeding to be judicial or administrative, which PDVSA
solves by filing their case under the bankruptcy law.128 No issue
arises for the third step or fourth step because a bankruptcy
proceeding would be taking place in Venezuela to collect.
Likewise, since the public-sector bankruptcy law grants control or
supervision of PDVSA’s assets by the Venezuelan court, and
reorganization is the purpose, PDVSA satisfies the remaining
criteria.
Once a court recognizes the foreign main proceeding in
Venezuela, PDVSA gains access to mandatory relief that is
automatically given under § 1520.129 Notably, § 1520 provides
relief for the debtor’s assets “within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States” which includes tangible and intangible property.130
The relief granted by § 1520 includes an automatic stay granted
by § 362, which protects the debtor’s assets from creditor actions,131
control of the debtor’s affairs by the foreign representative during
the administration of the case, and the use of § 363 to dispose of the
debtor’s property free and clear of any adverse interests,132 which
will be discussed below. The stay would give PDVSA time to carry
out the bankruptcy, as well as relief from the requirement to
continue paying creditors while the case is ongoing.
Further, § 1521 allows the court to grant additional permissive
126 See In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. at 136; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(23)
(2018) (defining “foreign proceeding.”).
127 Gilhuly et al., supra note 69, at 90.
128 See id.
129 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (2018).
130 Id. (“‘[W]ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’, when used with
reference to property of a debtor, refers to tangible property located within the territory of
the United States and intangible property deemed under applicable non-bankruptcy law to
be located within that territory, including any property subject to attachment or
garnishment that may properly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal or State
court in the United States.”).
131 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018).
132 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (2018).
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relief “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of this chapter and
to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”133
This includes staying protections of PDVSA’s assets that have not
been stayed by the automatic stay under § 1520, suspension of
transfer rights, and extending relief granted under § 1519. 134
Additionally, § 1521 allows the court to grant any relief the Code
allows for a bankruptcy trustee.135 Importantly, this could mean that
the assets of PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as PDV
Holding and CITGO, who are not “debtors” in the Chapter 15
proceeding could receive protection.
D. Potential Stumbling Blocks to Recognition
PDVSA faces two stumbling blocks that may preclude a U.S.
Bankruptcy Court from recognizing its foreign main proceeding.
The first stumbling block occurs if a court invokes § 1506 and
refuses to take action “if the action would be manifestly contrary to
the public policy of the United States.”136 It is possible that courts
could find recognizing a Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding to be
contrary to public policy due to the United States’ tense relationship
with Venezuela and the corrupt history of the Maduro regime.
However, the public policy provision is seldom used, largely
because the term “manifestly” constrains the ability of a judge to
invoke the provision.137 For example, in In re OAS S.A.,138 a
Brazilian bankruptcy law had substantial issues, including that it did
not provide “procedural and substantive fairness” to certain senior
noteholders, eliminated creditors’ “ability to avoid [certain] interdebtor transfers,” and failed to provide a remedy for fraudulent
transfers.139 Still, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern
District of New York did not invoke the public policy exception to
prevent recognition of the Brazilian bankruptcy law,140 because the
Brazilian bankruptcy law met the United States’ “fundamental
standards of fairness and accord[ed] with the course of civilized

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

11 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (2018).
See id.
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2018).
See In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 728 F.3d 301, 309 (3rd Cir. 2013).
In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Id. at 104.
See id. at 106.
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jurisprudence.”141 Similarly, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware elected not to invoke the public policy
provision in In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp.,142 despite the foreign
law creating an unfair proceeding. In that case, the “Irish
proceeding discriminate[d] against or disadvantage[d] U.S.
Citizens, deprive[d] U.S. creditors of due process, [was]
procedurally unfair . . . and [did] not grant the same fundamental
rights that creditors would receive in [a] U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts.”143 However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court refused to find the
Irish bankruptcy law to be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy,
because it found that the Irish bankruptcy law did not involve
“constitutional or statutory rights available in the United States.”144
The Court reasoned that the foreign law “‘established a different
way to achieve similar goals’ of United States statutes . . . [and the
foreign law] support[ed] the strong public policy of the United
States in favor of a universalism approach to complex multinational
bankruptcy proceedings.”145
In contrast, courts invoke the exception when the proceeding
“‘would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right’
and . . . an action should not be taken in a chapter 15 proceeding
where taking such action would frustrate a U.S. court’s ability to
administer the chapter 15 proceeding.”146 For example, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found in
In re Toft that the foreign representative’s reason for filing a Chapter
15 case impinged severely on a U.S. constitutional right.147 The
representative attempted to gain access to the debtor’s email
accounts, which were stored on the servers of internet service
providers located in the United States.148 This invoked the
prohibition of being manifestly contrary to public policy because
“the relief sought by the Foreign Representative [was] banned under
U.S. law, and it would result in criminal liability . . . [by] directly

Id. at 103.
In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp., No. 13-12159, 2014 WL 9953792, at *88-102
(Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
143 Id. at 58.
144 Id. at 70.
145 Id.
146 Gilhuly et al., supra note 69, at 70–71.
147 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
148 Id. at 188–96.
141
142
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compromise[ing] privacy rights . . . . [This] ‘would impinge
severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right.’”149 Similarly, the
Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of New York invoked the
public policy exception in In re Gold & Honey, Ltd. The proceeding
“reward[ed] and legitimize[d the creditors’] violation of both the
automatic stay and . . . [the bankruptcy court’s orders] regarding the
stay[,]” which are two of the most fundamental policies of the
automatic stay.150 Therefore, it appears that “manifestly contrary to
public policy” is a high standard, and even if a public-sector
insolvency law enacted in Venezuela contains potentially
problematic elements, the U.S. bankruptcy courts still may be
unlikely to find it to violate § 1506. Moreover, if the United States
lifts its sanctions against Venezuela, this means a friendlier
relationship with the country and the government is in place, and
because of this, a court could be persuaded that this presents
sufficient evidence not to invoke the public policy exception.
The second stumbling block Venezuela faces is a finding by a
U.S. court that the law fraudulently permits PDVSA to refuse
payment to creditors. A court could find the law to be fraudulent
because the only reason that Venezuela would make a bankruptcy
law is to get PDVSA out of paying its creditors and enacting one
was not considered at the time of the issuance of the bonds.
However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of
New York refused to deny recognition in In re International Bank
of Azerbaijan despite fraudulent objections against Azerbaijan’s
amendment to its bankruptcy law immediately before filing for
Chapter 15.151
This amendment prevented substantive and
procedural due process and allowed preference of creditors, and yet
the court recognized the proceeding because it did not violate
fundamental principles of the United States.152 Moreover, the
contract language of the PDVSA bonds clarifies that a Venezuelan
bankruptcy was considered at the time of issuance. Specifically,
under the “Risk Factors” subheading in the contract, if PDVSA is
“subjected to Venezuelan bankruptcy or insolvency law, the ability
of the Noteholders to recover their investment in the Notes will be
substantially impaired and will be subordinated to several classes of
149
150
151
152

Id. at 198.
In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 20, n. 36.
Id.
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creditors.”153 Additionally, Venezuela passing a bankruptcy law
signals to the courts that they are providing the opportunity for
PDVSA and other public-sector companies to restructure their debts
fairly and effectively to prevent a default.154 Thus, it is possible that
a court will grant recognition by refusing to find the law to be
fraudulent.
E. Confirmation Plan with a Section 363 Sale
Because of PDVSA’s importance to the Venezuelan economy,
confirming a plan where Venezuela relinquishes control and
ownership of PDVSA is not an option. This conflicts with the
absolute priority rule, one of the key features of the American
bankruptcy system, which states that equity holders in the bankrupt
business cannot receive or retain anything under the confirmed plan
unless all of the unsecured creditors are paid in full.155 If the
Venezuelan bankruptcy plan violated such a key tenet of American
bankruptcy law, it is unlikely that the plan would be confirmed by
the U.S. bankruptcy courts.
One possible workaround for this problem would be to confirm
a plan around a § 363 sale of substantially all of PDVSA’s assets156
to a new entity, New PDVSA, that is wholly owned by the
government of Venezuela.157 Under this plan, the government
would create a new corporate entity for the purpose of buying
PDVSA’s assets, then use the bankruptcy procedure to “auction”
PDVSA, with the new corporate entity as a stalking horse bidder.158
A stalking horse bid is an initial bid on the bankrupt company’s
assets used by the debtor to prevent against low bidding.159 In this
case, the amount bid and the terms attached by New PDVSA would
be used to dissuade other potential buyers from bidding on

See PDVSA, supra note 112.
Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 15.
155 Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
434–35 (1999).
156 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2018) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease . . . property of the estate.”).
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2) (2018) (permitting the use of § 363 in a foreign main
proceeding).
158 See Schilli, supra note 57.
159 See id.
153
154
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PDVSA.160 The most important of the terms to dissuade other
bidders is the Republic’s retention of the actual rights to the
hydrocarbon reserves. Because PDVSA does not own the rights to
these reserves, the rights are not in the bankruptcy estate, and would
not be sold, so no entity other than a government-controlled entity
would be guaranteed access to the oil reserves.161 Thus, no company
would risk purchasing an oil company without access to the oil
reserves. Moreover, the new entity would make a bid with such
generous terms that no other entity would be likely to match or
surpass it, and even if an entity did, acquiring assets without access
to the oil reserves makes little economic sense.
This plan would allow Venezuela to retain ownership of
PDVSA through its new entity free and clear of any adverse
interests,162 which would clear adverse interests worth billions of
dollars from secured and unsecured creditors, bond holders,
promissory note holders, and judicial claims.163 Following its
acquisition, New PDVSA would operate with none of PDVSA’s
currently held debt, which should allow the new entity to be
profitable again.164 The money given by New PDVSA for these
assets would then be used by PDVSA to pay its creditors based on
the priority of their claims. This purchase price could be funded by
new debt issued by either the new entity or the government.
Such a plan would not violate the absolute priority rule, so long
as New PDVSA’s bid was for the full value of the assets it
purchases. The absolute priority rule prevents an equity owner of
the debtor from receiving or retaining assets of the debtor only on
account of its equity interest.165 However, there is an exception to

See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4) (2018).
162 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018) (“The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) . . .
free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4)
such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”). Here, PDVSA
meets the requirements by either consenting or providing evidence of a dispute over their
property.
163 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 3.
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(l) (2018).
165 See Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
160
161
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this rule, the new value corollary, that allows the equity holders of
a debtor to receive assets under a plan if they provide new value to
the bankruptcy estate that is money or money’s worth and is equal
to the full value of the assets received.166 Under this proposed plan,
the government of Venezuela is not receiving anything on account
of their interest in PDVSA. It would instead receive any assets
PDVSA receives (to the degree to which it receives any assets while
acting through New PDVSA) account of the new value it has
contributed to the estate through the § 363 sale. Because the bid
amount must be large enough to dissuade other creditors from
bidding, it should be enough to cover the full value of the assets.
Therefore, this plan does not violate the absolute priority rule.
While it may seem improbable that this type of § 363 sale would
be confirmed by U.S. bankruptcy courts, a similar deal was
confirmed in In re General Motors.167 In General Motors, a § 363
sale was permitted where a new entity, New GM, purchased the
assets of GM, and the U.S. Treasury Department purchased a sixty
percent interest in New GM.168 The court found this permissible
because GM did not receive a better offer than the one from the U.S.
government, independent advisors found the offer to be fair, and
there was no other feasible way for GM to restructure its business
and remain viable.169 Although it may seem that a Venezuelan
bankruptcy plan that results in investors holding bonds for a New
PDVSA that remains under the control of the Venezuelan
government would be contrary to U.S. public policy, General
Motors suggests that a bankruptcy court may accept this type of
plan. As long as the plan is fair to creditors and there are not more
beneficial alternatives, General Motors provides at least a colorable
argument that a § 363 plan may be confirmed.
F. Benefits of Filing for a Chapter 15 Bankruptcy
While the likelihood of PDVSA passing every stage of a
Chapter 15 may be relatively low, it would be unwise for PDVSA
not to file for bankruptcy because of the possible leverage and other
benefits it will receive if it is filed. As noted above, the relief
444–45 (1999).
166 Id. at 456–58.
167 In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
168 Id. at 473.
169 Id. at 486–506.

2018

PDVSA'S WIN-WIN OPTION

27

provided by the court at each step protects PDVSA’s assets for at
least a temporary period of time.170 If confirmed, which would be
the best-case scenario, the PDVSA plan eliminates or significantly
reduces billions of dollars of debt from bondholders, promissory
note holders, and any judicial claims against PDVSA and its
Venezuelan entities. Additionally, PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan
entities, such as PDV Holding and CITGO, may also receive
protection and a discharge of its debt from PDVSA’s Chapter 15
proceeding if they successfully argue that the automatic stay should
extend to protect their assets.171
Even if the plan fails to get confirmed, at the very least, a few
extra months free and clear of creditor collection actions gives
PDVSA an ability to seek out-of-court restructuring options while
the Bankruptcy Court makes its decision. Moreover, if potential
holdout creditors face the threat of a bankruptcy plan being
confirmed, PDVSA yields greater leverage in its out-of-court
restructuring negotiations. This leverage provides a potential
method of binding holdout creditors through bankruptcy law, which
it does not have under the terms of its current bonds. Given the
value of some of the claims, risking a cramdown from bankruptcy
should incentivize some creditors to be more willing to negotiate in
an out-of-court proceeding, rather than elect to holdout and risk
recouping less under the bankruptcy.
A Chapter 15 bankruptcy provides PDVSA protection and
leverage that no other restructuring plan can offer—protection of its
assets and an increased likelihood of confirming an out of court
restructuring while simultaneously presenting its own restructuring
possibility that would leave it free and clear of any adverse interests.
Moreover, the likelihood of an out-of-court restructuring increases
with each requirement that PDVSA meets. Thus, whether the
Chapter 15 process results in a confirmed bankruptcy plan with a §
363 sale, brings creditors to the negotiating table, or merely
provides a temporary stay, Chapter 15 is a win-win option for
PDVSA.
IV. Conclusion
Venezuela’s current economic crisis presents an extremely
170
171

Id. at 463.
See In re Hibu, Inc., No 8-14-70323 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2014).
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complex and difficult restructuring for PDVSA. This Note aimed
at pursuing one option—a Chapter 15 proceeding. However, this
type of restructuring raises serious concerns that would need to be
addressed if used. First, it is highly unlikely that the current regime
desires being subject to United States’ jurisdiction and discovery for
a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, this type of proceeding may only
be possible with a regime change. Second, with the reserves
running lower every day, PDVSA would want to restructure sooner
rather than later. A bankruptcy proceeding, particularly one as
complex as this, could take longer than a year. This may not be time
that Venezuela or PDVSA can spare. Yet, this proposal is appealing
for that same reason—PDVSA can maximize its out-of-court
restructuring options while the bankruptcy proceeding is taking
place. Third, PDVSA may lack the funding required to consummate
a § 363 sale. Unlike in General Motors where the company received
funding from the U.S. government to keep control, PDVSA is not
in the same position to receive funding from its government because
of the economic crisis. This could be problematic for the
government of Venezuela because they need to keep control of
PDVSA. Thus, funding for the PDVSA sale will most likely have
to come from somewhere else. This funding should at least be for
the short term to consummate the sale in hope that, after the sale,
PDVSA will get back on its feet and improve its economic position.
Fourth, it is unclear if PDVSA would be eligible for relief under
Chapter 15 because PDVSA is likely an instrumentality of the
government of Venezuela, thereby a governmental unit as defined
in § 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus explicitly ineligible
for relief. This hinges upon a court finding that PDVSA is actually
carrying out some governmental function. However, as noted
earlier, PDVSA may still gain relief if PDVSA fails to meet this
requirement by arguing Chapter15’s broader scope warrants
eligibility. Fifth, creditors, such as Crystallex, have filed suit
against Venezuela seeking to pierce the veil under the alter ego
doctrine172 to acquire CITGO assets worth over a billion dollars, if
not protected by sovereign immunity.173 If successful, other
172 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
627–33 (1983) (holding that an alter ego relationship exists where (1) the “corporate entity
is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is
created,” or (2) recognizing the corporate entity as legally separate “would work fraud or
injustice.”).
173 See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., C.A. No. 17-mc-151-
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creditors will surely follow suit. Sixth, PDV Holding and CITGO
represent vital assets of PDVSA outside of Venezuela that need
protection, because they most likely would not be allowed to file for
bankruptcy in Venezuela, even if the Venezuelan bankruptcy law
permits it.
Thus, in order to protect these assets, PDVSA must pursue other
options to protect these assets. This may include filing these
companies under Chapter 11, moving the account receivables assets
into a bank in Venezuela to prevent seizure from creditors, or
arguing that the relief and protection from the Chapter 15
proceeding should extend to these entities. Notwithstanding these
concerns, filing bankruptcy under Chapter 15 offers PDVSA a
possible debt restructuring option that can eliminate all of PDVSA’s
debt if confirmed. Even if unsuccessful, it provides benefits and
leverage to pursue other out of court options while the bankruptcy
court makes its decision.
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